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Strategies to Inject Spoofed Measurement Data
to Mislead Kalman Filter
Zhongshun Zhang, Lifeng Zhou, and Pratap Tokekar
Abstract—We study the problem of designing false measure-
ment data that is injected to corrupt and mislead the output of
a Kalman filter. Unlike existing works that focus on detection
and filtering algorithms for the observer, we study the problem
from the attacker’s point-of-view. In our model, the attacker
can corrupt the measurements by injecting additive spoofing
signals. The attacker seeks to create a separation between the
estimate of the Kalman filter with and without spoofed signals.
We present a number of results on how to inject spoofing signals
while minimizing the magnitude of the injected signals. The
resulting strategies are evaluated through simulations along with
theoretical proofs. We also evaluate the spoofing strategy in
the presence of a χ2 spoof detector. The results show that the
proposed strategy can successfully mislead a Kalman filter while
ensuring it is not detected.
I. INTRODUCTION
As autonomous systems proliferate, there are growing con-
cerns about their security and safety [2], [3]. Of particular
concern is their vulnerability to signal spoofing attacks [4].
As a result, many researchers are designing algorithms that
enable an observer to detect and mitigate signal spoofing
attacks (e.g., [5]–[9]). We study the problem from the opposite
(i.e., the attacker’s) point-of-view. Our goal is to characterize
the capabilities of the attacker that is generating the spoofing
signals while assuming that the observer is using a Kalman
filter for state estimation.
The problem of generating spoofing attacks has been studied
specifically for GPS signals. Tippenhauer et al. [4] describe
the requirements as well as present a methodology for gener-
ating spoofed GPS signals. Larcom and Liu [10] presented a
taxonomy of GPS spoofing attacks.
The typical approach to mitigate sensor spoofing attacks
is by designing robust state estimators [11]. Fawzi et al. [12]
presented the design of a state estimator for a linear dynamical
system when some of the sensor measurements are corrupted
by an adversarial attacker. We focus on the scenario where the
observer uses a Kalman Filter (KF) for estimating the state
using measurements that are corrupted by additive spoofing
signals by the attackers. We study the problem of generating
spoofing signals of minimum energy that can achieve any
desired separation between the KF estimate with spoofing and
without spoofing. We show that for many practical cases, the
spoofing signals can be generated using linear programming
in polynomial time.
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A preliminary version of this paper, without the evaluation with χ2 detector
in Section V, was presented at ACC 2018 [1].
Many recent works have undertaken research for design
spoofing data against a healthy estimation environment. Such
as LQG control system [13], GPS system [14], wireless sensor
networks [15] and electric power grids [16].
In [16], the author presents false data injection attacks,
against state estimation in electric power grids. This paper
shows that an attacker can exploit the configuration of a
power system to launch such attacks to successfully introduce
arbitrary errors into certain state variables while bypassing
existing techniques for bad measurement detection.
Another work by Su et al. [14] is closely related to ours. The
authors show how to spoof the GPS signal without triggering
a detector that uses the residual in the Kalman filter. They
present a 1-step (greedy) online spoofing strategy that solves
a linear relaxation of a Quadratically Constrained Quadratic
Program (QCQP) at each timestep. We present a strategy that
plans for T future timesteps, instead of just the next timestep,
while minimizing the spoofing signal energy. Furthermore, we
characterize the scenarios under which our strategy finds the
optimal solution in polynomial time.
The work that is most closely related to ours is by Mo et
al. [13], [15]. Their goal is to design false measurement data to
mislead a system with Kalman filter [15] or an LQG control
system [13]. Both, our work and the aforementioned work,
assume that the system is linear with Gaussian noise and that
a discrete Kalman filter is used to estimate the state. However,
in [15], the objective is to design the false data to mislead a
certain failure detector (χ2 failure detector). The paper gives
an inner and outer approximation for a reachable set that can
mislead the system while not being detected by the χ2 failure
detector.
Various failure detectors have been proposed in the liter-
ature. Jones [17] presented one of the first work on failure
detection in linear systems. They presented a linear filter
that increases the sensitivity of the residual of the filter,
which helps to improve the detection of a particular failure.
Brumback et al. [18] presented a χ2 test for fault detection in
Kalman filters. Mo et al. [15] studied the effect of false data
injection attacks on state estimation with a χ2 failure detectors.
In this paper, we study how to design spoofing signals
that is agnostic to the failure detector. Instead, we minimize
the magnitude of the injected signals while still ensuring the
desired separation in the filter output. We provide numerical
simulations to show our strategy successfully misleads the χ2
detector.
Based on the motion model of the target and the evolution
of the KF, three problems for spoofing design are formulated
in Section II. Section III shows the approaches to solve these
optimization problems. The simulations for verifying spoofing
strategies are given in Section IV. Section V provides a
ar
X
iv
:1
80
9.
04
75
6v
1 
 [c
s.S
Y]
  1
3 S
ep
 20
18
Fig. 1. The evolution of KF estimate by applying zt and z˜t, respectively.
numerical example to illustrate how the proposed spoofing
strategy can be applied to a system equipped with a failure
detector. Finally, Section VI summarizes the conclusion and
future work.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Notation: We denote the set of positive real number by R+,
the set of positive integer by Z+. The set of real vectors with
dimension n is denoted by Rn, n ∈ Z+, and the set of real
matrices with m rows and n columns by Rm×n, m, n ∈ Z+.
We write ‖·‖pp, p ∈ Z+ as the pth power of Lp vector norm,
E(·) as the expectation of a random variable, In as the identity
matrix with size n, n ∈ Z+, and N (µ, σ2) as the normal
distribution with mean µ and variance σ2.
We consider a scenario where an observer estimates the
location of a target using a KF in 2D plane. The target misleads
the observer by adding spoofing signals to the observer’s
measurement. We define the target’s model as:
xt+1 = Fxt + Gut + ωt, (1)
where F ,G ∈ R2×2, xt ∈ R2 is the position of the target,
ut ∈ R2 is the control input and wt ∼ N (0, R) is the Gaussian
distribution, model noise of the motion model with R ∈ R2×2.
The observer estimates the target’s position using a linear
measurement model:
zt = Hxt + vt, (2)
where H ∈ R2×2 and vt ∼ N (0, Q) gives the measurement
noise with Q ∈ R2×2.
In order to mislead the observer, the target corrupts the
observer’s measurement by adding spoofing signal to mislead
the observer’s estimate. We assume the measurement received
by the observer is z˜t ∈ R2 with spoofing signal (Equation (3))
instead of the true measurement zt ∈ R2 without spoofing sig-
nal (Equation (2)). The spoofing signal t := [tx, ty]T ∈ R2
adds additional measurement error:
z˜t = zt + t. (3)
The observer uses a KF to estimate target’s position with
initial distribution N (m0,Σ0). Since it receives the spoofing
measurement z˜t for updating, we denote distributions gen-
erated by the evolution of its KF as N (m˜t, Σ˜t) when step
t ≥ 1, t ∈ Z+. We also denote the distributions generated
by the evolution of a KF using true measurement zt as
N (mt,Σt). The goal for the target is to set the separation
between the mean estimate mt and m˜t. The target’s spoofing
signal is each step within the planning horizon for which
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Fig. 2. Signal spoofing process and its effect on the observer’s KF estimation.
some desired separation, dt ≥ 0, must be achieved (Figure 1).
Figure 2 shows the target’s spoofing process where it uses
the initial guess of N (m0,Σ0) denoted as N (m˜0, Σ˜0) and
desired separation dt to design spoofing signal t. In order to
avoid detection, the targets seeks to minimize the magnitude of
the spoofing signal. We first propose two problems for offline
scenarios as follows.
A. Offline Spoofing Signal Design with Known N (m0,Σ0)
If the target knows N (m0,Σ0) of the KF, then the target
can set N (m˜0, Σ˜0) equal to N (m0,Σ0).
Problem 1 (Offline with Known N (m0,Σ0)). Consider a
target with motion model (Equation (1)), measurement model
(Equation (2)), and spoofing measurement model (Equa-
tion (3)). Assume target knows N (m0,Σ0). Find a sequence
of spoofing signal inputs, {1, 2, · · · , T } to achieve desired
separation dt between m˜t and mt at step t. Such that,
minimize
T∑
t=1
γt · ‖t‖pp
subject to,
‖mt−m˜t‖pp≥ dpt , ∀t (4)
where γt ∈ R+ is a weighing parameter and T ∈ Z+ is the
optimization horizon.
B. Offline Spoofing Signal Design with Unknown N (m0,Σ0)
Next, we consider the case where the target does not know
the initial condition in the KF. Instead, we assume that the
initial estimate m˜0 is not too far away from m0 (in exception).
Problem 2 (Offline with Unknown N (m0,Σ0)). Consider a
target with motion model (Equation (1)), measurement model
(Equation (2)), and spoofing measurement model (Equa-
tion (3)). Assume the target starts spoofing with m˜0, where
E(m0−m˜0) = M0 and Σ˜0 6= Σ0. Find a sequence of spoofing
signal inputs, {1, 2, · · · , T } to achieve desired separation
dt between m˜t and mt (in expectation) at step t. Such that
minimize
T∑
t=1
γt · ‖t‖pp
subject to,
‖E(mt−m˜t)‖pp≥ dpt , ∀t (5)
where γt ∈ R+ is a weighing parameters and T ∈ Z+ is the
optimization horizon.
III. SIGNAL SPOOFING STRATEGIES
In this section, we show how to solve Problems 1 and 2
when p = 1 and p = 2. We first present the relationship
between the separation mt− m˜t and the initial bias m0− m˜0.
Theorem 1. Consider a target with motion model (Equa-
tion (1)), measurement model (Equation (2)), and spoofing
measurement model (Equation (3)). The evolutions of the KFs
by applying zt and z˜t give the distributions N (mt,Σt) and
N (m˜t, Σ˜t), respectively. The difference, mt − m˜t is,
mt − m˜t =
t−1∏
i=0
At−i · (m0 − m˜0)+
t−2∑
i=0
 i∏
j=0
At−j(Bt−1−i + Ct−1−i)
+Bt + Ct,
(6)
where At = F − K˜tHF , Bt = (Kt −
K˜t) [zt −H(Fmt−1 + Gut−1)] , Ct = −K˜tt.
The proof is given in the appendix.
Corollary 1. The expected value of the separation is,
E (mt − m˜t)
=
t−1∏
i=0
At−iM0 +
t−2∑
i=0
 i∏
j=0
At−jCt−1−i
+ Ct. (7)
Proof. From Equation 6, E (mt − m˜t) follows,
E (mt − m˜t)
= E
t−2∑
i=0
i∏
j=0
At−j ·Bt−1−i +Bt
+
t−1∏
i=0
At−iE(m0 − m˜0) +
t−2∑
i=0
 i∏
j=0
At−jCt−1−i
+ K˜tt.
The actual measurement is: zi = H(Fmi−1+Gui−1+wi)+vi,
where wi and vi are Gaussian noises with zero mean. The
expected measurement value is: E(zi) = H(Fmi−1 +Gui−1)
for all i, thus E[zi−H(Fmi−1 +Gui−1)] = 0. Since E[Bi] =
0, we have,
E (mt − m˜t)
=
t−1∏
i=0
At−iE(m0 − m˜0) +
t−2∑
i=0
 i∏
j=0
At−jK˜t−1−it−1−i

+ K˜tt.
(8)
Since we assume E(m0− m˜0) = M0 in Problem 2, the claim
is guaranteed.
Theorem 1 shows the difference between the two estimated
means at step t depends on the initial means, m0 and m˜0, and
the initial covariance matrices Σ0 and Σ˜0. This is because
the Kalman gain Kt depends on the covariance matrix Σt.
If target sets m0 = m˜0 and Σ0 = Σ˜0, it has Σt = Σ˜t for
all t since the covariance matrix is updated through the same
Kalman prediction and update equation (see appendix). Thus,
Bt = 02×2 and then Equation (6) can be simplified as:
mt − m˜t =
t−2∑
i=0
 i∏
j=0
At−jCt−1−i
+ Ct.
As a result, mt − m˜t is independent of the measurements
{z1, z2, · · · , zt} when m0 = m˜0 and Σ0 = Σ˜0. Thus, the
target can generate spoofing signal inputs by solving Problem
1 offline. Similarly, following Corollary 1, Problem 2 can be
saved offline as well.
Problems 1 and 2 are two nonlinear programming prob-
lems for arbitrary vector norms Lp. However, when p = 1,
they can be formulated as linear programming problems.
Linear programming can be solved in polynomial time [19].
When p = 2, they become QCQP (Quadratically Constrained
Quadratic Program). The following shows the LP and QCQP
formulations.
Theorem 2. If p = 1 and the elements in F and I−KtH are
all positive, then Problems 1 and 2 can be solved optimally
with linear programming. If p = 1 and the elements in F and
I −KtH are not all positive, then Problems 1 and 2 can be
solved optimally with 4k linear programming instances. If p =
2 and {H,F , Q,R} are diagonal matrices, then Problems 1
and 2 can be solved optimally with linear programming.
A. Linear Programming Formulation for L1 Vector Norm
Here, we show how to formulate Problem 1 using linear
programming. A similar procedure can be applied to formulate
Problem 2 as linear programming.
The constraint in Problem 1 (Equation 4) follows:
‖mt − m˜t‖1=
∥∥∥∥∥∥
t−2∑
i=0
 i∏
j=0
At−jCt−1−i
+ Ct
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥
t−2∑
i=0
 i∏
j=0
Aj+1 · K˜t−1−i · t−1−i
+ K˜tt
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≥ dt, (9)
where t = 1, 2, · · · , T . ∏ij=0At−j · K˜i ∈ R2×2 is a constant
matrix for each i ∈ {1, · · · , t − 1} and is calculated from
the KF iteration with initial covariance Σ0 and Σ˜0. Since L1
vector norm is the sum of the absolute values of the elements
for a given vector, Problem 1 can be directly formulated as a
linear programming problem when p = 1.
Then we show how to transform this constraint to a
standard linear constraint form Gtxt ≥ dt with xt :=
[1x, · · · , tx, 1y, · · · , ty]T . The left side of Equation (9) can
be formulated as
‖mt − m˜t‖1=
∥∥∥∥ a0 + a11x + · · · attx + · · ·+ a2ttyb0 + b11x + · · · bttx + · · ·+ b2tty
∥∥∥∥
1
(10)
where a0, a1, · · · , a2t, b0, b1, · · · , b2t are corresponding coef-
ficients from Equation 6.
Lemma 1. If the elements in matrices F and I − KtH are
positive, then ‖mt−m˜t‖1 is a linear combination of |ix| and
|iy|, and Problem 1 can be solved as a single LP instance.
Proof. According to the proof of Theorem 1 appendix, all the
coefficients {a1, ..., a2t, b1, ..., b2t} are positive if the elements
in matrices F and I − KtH are positive. Therefore, the
objective function and the constraints are linear in |ix| and
|iy|. There always exists an optimal solution where all ix ≥ 0
and iy ≥ 0 or where all ix ≤ 0 and iy ≤ 0. The objective
function in both cases will be the same. Without loss of
generality, we can assume ix ≥ 0 and iy ≥ 0, which can
be solved using a single LP instance.
The linear programming strategy containing k constraints is
presented in Algorithm 1. G denotes matrix in the linear con-
straint Gx ≥ Dk where x := [1x, · · · , Tx, 1y, · · · , Ty]T
and Dk is the collection of k nonzero separations dt, t ∈
{1, · · · , T}.
Algorithm 1: Linear Programming Formulation
1 Initial← {(xo,Σ0,F ,H,G, Q,R, u}
2 G← 0k×2T
3 Calculate Kalman gain K˜1, · · · , K˜T
4 for i = 1 to the qth value in Dk do
5 g =
∏T−1
j=i Aj+1K˜i;
6 Gq,i = sum of all rows in g
7 end
8 Return G
If Lemma 1 does not hold, it is possible that some elements
in a0, a1, · · · , a2t, b0, b1, · · · , b2t can be positive and some are
negative. In general, there are four different cases depending
on the sign of the first row and the second row for considering
each constraint ‖mt − m˜t‖1≥ dt (Equation 10). Then we can
obtain four linear optimization problems along four different
sub-constraints of each constraint ‖mt − m˜t‖1≥ dt. Thus, in
the worst case, the optimal solution can be obtained by solving
4k linear optimization problems. We run Algorithm 1 4k times
by changing the sign of rows in g (Line 5) appropriately.
B. Quadratically Constrained Quadratic Program Formula-
tion for L2 Vector Norm
When p = 2, Problems 1 and 2 can be formulated as QCQPs
[20]:
minimize
1
2
xT P0x
s.t. − 1
2
xT D
T
t Dtx + d
2
t ≤ 0, ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T} (11)
where x = [21x, 
2
1y, · · · , 2Tx, 2Ty]T , P0 = I2T , and
Dt ∈ R2T×2T :=
∏t−1
j=1Aj+1K˜0 · · · 0 0 0
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
0 · · · ∏t−1j=t−1Aj+1K˜t−1 0 0 0
0 · · · 0 K˜t 0 0
0 · · · 0 0 0 0
0 · · · 0 0 0 . . .

Unfortunately, the QCQP formulations for these three prob-
lems are NP-hard since the constraint in each problem is
concave. If F ,G,H, Σ˜0 are diagonal matrices, it can be shown
that Dt is also a diagonal matrix. We can transform the
QCQP formulation to a linear programming problem by using
change of variables {2tx, 2ty}, t = {1, 2, ..., T}, and using a
procedure similar to p = 1.
If Dt is not a diagonal matrix, one solution is to apply
the inequality
√
2‖x‖2≥ ‖x‖1 between L1 vector norm and
L2 vector norm. The constraint can be changed to L1 vector
norm, which is a stricter constraint. A sub-optimal solution
can be obtained by using the L1 vector norm.
C. Receding Horizon: Spoofing with online measurement
Problems 1 and 2 describe the offline versions for spoofing.
We also extend the offline problems to an online version. The
following formulates an online spoofing scenario.
Consider a target with motion model (Equation (1)),
measurement model (Equation (2)), and spoofing measure-
ment model (Equation (3)). Assume the target does not
know N (x0,Σ0). It collects a series of measurements
{zreal1 , zreal2 , · · · , zrealto } from step 1 to current step to. Find
a sequence of spoofing signal inputs, {to , to+1, · · · , to+H}
to achieve desired separation dt between m˜t and mt (in
expectation) within future H steps. Such that
minimize
to+H∑
t=t0
γt · ‖t‖pp
s.t. ‖E(mt−m˜t)‖pp≥ dpt , ∀t ∈ {to, · · · , to +H} (12)
where γt ∈ R+ is a weighing parameter, to is the current
time, and H is the predictive time horizon. The target applies
t = to as spoofing signal input at each step t.
IV. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we simulate the effectiveness of spoofing
strategies for Problems 1, 2 and online case (Section III-C)
where a target designs spoofing signals t to mislead an
observer by achieving the desired separations dt between mt
and m˜t. Our code is available online.1
We consider the L1 vector norm and the following models,
F = I2×2,G = I2×2, u =
[
1
1
]
, R = 0.5I2×2, Q = 0.5I2×2.
Set the weight γt = 1 for all t.
For Problem 1, set the initial condition for the KF as,
Σ0 = I2×2, m0 =
[
0 0
]T
.
1https://github.com/raaslab/signal spoofing.git
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Fig. 3. Offline signal spoofing with known (m0,Σ0).
Since the target knows N (x0,Σ0), it sets m˜0 = m0 and
Σ˜0 = Σ0. We first consider a scenario where the target
wants to achieve the desired separation at steps, t = 5, 10, 15,
denoted as d5 = 1.77, d10 = 3.54 and d15 = 5.30 with the
optimization horizon T = 20. The target generates a sequence
of spoofing signals {1, · · · , 20} offline by using a linear
programming solver. The spoofing performance is shown in
Figure 3-(a) where the true separations are the same as the
desired separations. Same successful spoofing achieved when
the desired separations are chosen as dt = 0.25
√
2t, t =
{3, ..., 15}, as shown in Figure 3-(b).
In Problem 2, the target knows E(m0−m˜0) = M0 but does
not know Σ0. The spoofing result is no longer deterministic but
holds in expectation ‖E(mt− m˜t)‖1≥ dt. Figure 4-(a) shows
spoofing signals for desired separations as d1 = 2 with T = 6
and M0 = 1. Set N (m˜0, Σ˜0) as N (0, 1.5I2), m0 as a random
variable (m0 ∼ N (1, 1)) and Σ0 = I2. In order to see the
effectives of the spoofing signals {1, · · · , 5}, we conduct 100
trials for each desired separation d2 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Figure 4-
(b) shows the ‖m1 − m˜1‖1 is no longer deterministic, but
‖E(m1 − m˜1)‖1 is close to the desired value d1 = 2.
For online case, spoofing signals are continuously gener-
ated by using receding horizon optimization with new noisy
measurements. We set the receding horizon as H = 15.
Even though offline strategy performs comparatively as online
strategy (Figure 5), online spoofing strategy achieves almost
the same separation as the desired, while offline strategy has
certain divergence (Figure 6). This is because online strategy
can update the measurement at each step. Figure 7 shows
the online strategy applies less total spoofing magnitude than
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offline strategy.
V. SIGNAL SPOOFING WITH χ2 FAILURE DETECTOR
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the false
data injection strategy in the presence of a failure detector.
We assume a χ2 failure detector is used in our spoofing
design system. A χ2 detector computes the following measure,
gk = (zk −Hmk)TΣk(zk −Hmk) (13)
where, Σk is the covariance matrix, and zk − Hmk is the
residue of the Kalman filter [21]. If gk > threshold, the
detector raises an alarm that the filter is under attack.
In general, if the threshold is too low, it may lead to false
alarms. On the other hand, a higher threshold is not sensitive
enough to detect a true spoofing attack. Therefore, to pick
an appropriate value for the threshold, we measured the false
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Fig. 6. Divergence caused by online spoofing and offline spoofing. The blue
line denotes (‖m˜t − mt‖1−dt) for online spoofing, and red line denotes
(‖m˜t −mt‖1−dt) for offline spoofing.
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Fig. 7. Total spoofing energy injected by online and offline strategies.
alarm rate for a Kalman filter that is not under attack for
various values of the threshold. Figure 8 shows the false alarm
rate for a Kalman filter not under attack. The false alarm
rate decreases as the threshold increases. Lienhart et al. [22]
presented a false alarm detection method which achieves a
12.5% false alarm rate. The nearest value in our case is a
false alarm rate of 11.054% which corresponds to the threshold
value of 1.5. Therefore, for the rest of the evaluation, we use
the threshold to be equal to 1.5.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
Threshold
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
fa
ls
e
a
la
r
m
s
Fig. 8. False alarm rate. We did 100 simulations for a given value of the
threshold. Each simulation consisted of 1000 trials. We plot the mean (red
stars) as well as the minimium and maximum number of times the detector
raised an alarm for the 100 simulations.
In the rest of this section, we consider a scenario where the
target wants to achieve the desired separation of d ≥ 3. We
consider two strategies to achieve this separation. First, we
consider a scenario where the attacker injects spoofing signals
abruptly at a specific time instance. Then, we consider a sce-
nario where the attacker gradually injects the spoofing signals
to eventually achieve the desired separation. We evaluate the
performance in the presence of the χ2 detector.
A. Abrupt Failure
A simple spoofing strategy is to pick a single time instance
to inject the spoofing noise. Here, we choose to inject a
spoofing signal to achieve d5 = 3. We ran 1000 trials using
our spoofing strategy. As expected, in all 1000 trials, the χ2
detector was able to detect the attack. One such trial is shown
in Figure 9. Here, the χ2 detector output g5 is more than 10
times the threshold and is easily detected. This confirms the
intuition that an abrupt failure is likely to be detected.
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Fig. 9. Estimated positions and the χ2 detector’s output, gk , when the
spoofing signals are injected abruptly by setting d5 = 3. The shaded region
indicates when the detector raises an alarm.
B. Gradually Increasing the Separation
Instead of abruptly injecting spoofing signals, a better strat-
egy is to gradually increase the separation. Here, we choose
to gradually inject the spoofing signals over 15 steps. The
desired separation is set to dt = 0.2t. At step t = 15, we
achieve d15 = 3.
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Fig. 10. Estimated positions and the χ2 detector’s output, gk , when the
spoofing signals are injected abruptly by setting dt = 0.2t.
We ran 1000 trials using this strategy. Figure 10 shows the
result of one trial. The χ2 detector detected the attack in 267
trials. This corresponds to a p–value of 9.2133× 10−43. The
p–value [23] is the probability of detecting an attack in 267
or more trials under the null hypothesis that the system is not
under attack (when the false alarm rate is equal to 11.054%.
Lower p–value implies an unlikely event suggesting that the
null hypothesis is wrong. A p–value of 9.2133×10−43 is low
enough to reject the null hypothesis.
Next, we make the false data injection even more gradual.
The desire separation is set as dt = 0.1t. The final separation
goal is still d > 3 which is now achieved at t = 30 instead of
t = 15.
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Fig. 11. Estimated positions and the χ2 detector’s output, gk , when the
spoofing signals are injected abruptly by setting dt = 0.1t.
In 1000 trials, the χ2 detector detected an attack in 118
instances. This is close to the actual false alarm rate without
any attack. In this scenario, the system will not be able to
distinguish between false and true alarms. This is reflected
in the p–value computation. 118 detections in 1000 trials
correspond to a p–value of 0.2393. This p–value is large
enough which incorrectly suggests that the null hypothesis (the
system is not under attack) is true. Therefore, in this scenario,
the signal spoofing strategy is able to successfully mislead the
χ2 detector.
As a result, we can see that the χ2 detector can detect
failures in many cases when the signals are injected abruptly.
However, using our spoofing strategy, the separation can be
carefully and gradually designed so as to make it unlikely for
the χ2 detector to distinguish between false alarms and true
alarms. As long as the desired separation is made gradual,
the probability of being detected will keep decreasing and
eventually make it indistinguishable from false alarms.
VI. CONCLUSION
We study the problem of injecting spoofing signals to
achieve a desired separation in the output of a Kalman filter
without and with attack. We study many variants of the
problem. Our main approach was to formulate the problems
as nonlinear, constrained optimization problems in order to
minimize the energy of the spoofing signal. We show that
under some technical assumptions, the problems can be solved
by linear programming optimally. We present a more compu-
tationally expensive approach to solve the problem, without
the aforementioned assumptions. We also present numerical
examples to show how this strategy can successfully mislead
the χ2 failure detector.
Our immediate future work is to study the game-theoretic
aspects of the problem. In this work, we did not consider any
active strategy being employed by the observer to mitigate the
attack. In future works, we will consider the case of designing
spoofing signals that explicitly take the attack mitigation
strategies into account. In all the problems considered in this
paper, the desired separations are taken as inputs provided by
the user. The simulation results suggest that carefully choosing
a specific profile of the desired separation can make it harder to
detect by the observer. A possible extension is to automatically
generate the optimal profile that not only minimizes the signal
energy but also ensures that it is not detected by the observer.
Another future work is to extend the strategy to more general
non-linear state estimation approaches, such as the extended
Kalman filter, unscented Kalman filter, and particle filters.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Before we prove Theorem 1, we review the Kalman Filter
update equations. Suppose the true measurement is zt, the KF
estimation is:
xt|t−1 = Fxt−1|t−1 + Gut, (14)
xt|t = Fxt|t−1 +Kt(zt −Hxt|t−1), (15)
where Kt is the Kalman gain and is given by:
Kt = (FΣt|t−1F ′ +Rt)H′(HΣt|t−1H′ +Qt)−1. (16)
According to the Kalman gain update equation (16), the
evolution covariance matrix at step t, Σt, only depends on
the state model parameters and the initial condition of the
covariance matrix Σ0. The Kalman gain at step t, Kt de-
pends on the covariance matrix Σt. Both Σt and Kt do not
depend on the control input series {ut}t=1,··· ,k, measurement
{zt}t=1,··· ,k. Thus, the covariance matrix and the Kalman gain
can be predicted from the KF covariance update steps.
Σt+1|t = FΣt|tF ′ +Rt,
Σt+1|t+1 = (I −KtH)Σt+1|t.
(17)
From Equation (17), the Kalman gain can be predicted from
the initial condition Σ0.
We now prove our main result.
Proof. From the update of KF, we have
mt = mt|t−1 +Kt(zt −Hmt|t−1)
= (I −KtH)mt|t−1 +Ktzt
= (I −KtH)(Fmt−1 + Gut−1) +Ktzt.
(18)
and
m˜t = (I −KtH)(Fmt−1 + Gut−1) +Kt(zt + t).
Recursively,
mt − m˜t
=(I −KtH)(Fmt−1 + Gut−1) +Ktzt
− [(I − K˜tH)(Fm˜t−1 + Gut−1) + K˜t(zt + t)]
=(F −KtHF)mt−1 − (F − K˜tHF)m˜t−1
− (Kt − K˜t)HGut−1 + [Ktzt − K˜t(zt + t)]
=(F − K˜tHF)mt−1 − (F − K˜tHF)mt−1
− (Kt − K˜t)HGut−1 + (Kt − K˜t)zt − K˜tt
− (Kt − K˜t)HFmt−1
=(F − K˜tHF)(mt−1 − m˜t−1)
+ (Kt − K˜t)[zt −H(Fmt−1 + Gut−1)]− K˜tt.
(19)
Define, At = F−K˜tHF , Bt = (Kt−K˜t)[zt−H(Fmt−1+
Gut−1)] and Ct = −K˜tt. Then,
mt−m˜t
=At(mt−1 − m˜t−1) +Bt + Ct
=At[At−1(mt−2 − m˜t−2) +Bt−1 + Ct−1] +Bt + Ct
. . .
=
t−1∏
i=0
At−i · (m0 − m˜0) + (Bt + Ct)
+At(Bt−1 + Ct−1) + · · ·+At · · ·A3A2(B1 + C1)
=
t−1∏
i=0
At−i · (m0 − m˜0) +Bt + Ct
+
t−2∑
i=0
 i∏
j=0
At−j(Bt−1−i + Ct−1−i)
 .
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